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In the present paper, I suggest a modification to some aspects of Ingarden’s analyses of the sound-syn-
chronized filmic work of art. The argument progresses through two stages: (1)  I clarify Ingarden’s 
claim that the work of art is a stratified formation in which the various aspects present objectivities; 
(2)  I elucidate and critically assess Ingarden’s suggestion that the filmic work of art is a borderline 
case in respect to other types of works of art—paintings and literary works. Here, I identify a problem 
with Ingarden’s claims about the function of sound in the concretized filmic work’s presentation of its 
fictive world. Ingarden identifies the presented universe of the filmic work of art as a habitus of real-
ity, but Ingarden seems oddly conflicted with respect to his notion of habitus. I argue that this stems 
from Ingarden’s conceptualization of the filmic work of art as primarily composed of the stratum of 
represented “visible aspects” in both the cases of the silent film and the sound-synchronized film, and 
his restriction of the role of phonetic content in the latter. I suggest that were we to reconceptualise the 
role of aurally presented phonetic content in the concretized sound-synchronized film, we could better 
understand how film has the seeming magical capacity to transfix us.
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В данной статье я осуществляю модификацию некоторых аспектов Ингарденовского анализа 
кинематографического произведения искусства, синхронизированного со звуком. Аргумента-
ция осуществляется в два этапа: (1) я проясняю утверждение Ингардена о том, что произведение 
искусства — это стратифицированная формация, в которой различные аспекты представляют 
собой объективности; (2) я разъясняю и критически переосмысляю тезис Ингардена, согласно 
которому произведение киноискусства является пограничным случаем по отношению к другим 
видам произведений искусства  — картинам и  литературным произведениям. Здесь я считаю 
проблематичными утверждения Ингардена о функции звука в конкретизированной кинемато-
графической презентации вымышленного им мира. Ингарден отождествляет вселенную, пред-
ставленную кинематографическим произведением искусства, с габитусом реальности, но стран-
ным образом противоречит своему собственному понятию габитуса. Я  утверждаю, что это 
обусловлено концептуализацией кинематографического произведения искусства Ингарденом 
в качестве феномена, состоящего, в первую очередь из слоя представленных «видимых аспектов», 
конститутивных как для немого, так и для синхронизированного со звуком кино, а также ограни-
чением роли фонетического содержания в озвученных фильмах. Я предполагаю, что, если бы мы 
переосмыслили роль звукового представления фонетического содержания в конкретизирован-
ном звуко-синхронизированном фильме, мы могли бы лучше понять, каким образом в фильме 
появляется кажущаяся магической способность поражать нас.
Ключевые слова: Ингарден, фильм, звук, онтология, немое кино, эстетика.
1. INTRODUCTION
Roman Ingarden only wrote about the filmic work of art twice during his philo-
sophical career1. Despite their relative brevity—especially in comparison to Ingarden’s 
exquisitely detailed analysis of literary works—the two sets of remarks (separated by 
the span of sixteen years) on the filmic work of art have generated substantive critical 
response2. Ingarden’s first “analysis” (Ingarden, 1973b, 323) of the filmic work of art 
1 Ingarden discusses the filmic work of art in The Literary Work of Art (Ingarden, 1973) and Ontology 
of the Work of Art (Ingarden, 1989). 
2 While the three volumes of Analecta Husserliana (Tymieniecka, 1976; Rudnick, 1990; Tymieniecka, 
1991) that are devoted to explorations of Ingarden’s ontology and aesthetics, contain little discus-
sion of how these might be applied to the filmic work, volume forty-one rectifies this oversight with 
the inclusion of a marvelous paper addressing Ingarden’s aesthetics in reference to filmic works of 
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is a mere six paragraphs long; whereas his second set of remarks on the filmic work 
of art is thirty-nine paragraphs in length. Strangely, Ingarden characterizes the latter 
as “introductory remarks” (Ingarden, 1989, 320). In both of his sets of writings on the 
filmic work of art, Ingarden maintains that it is a “borderline case” in relation to other 
works of art, and it presents a world that is quasi-real (i.e. a habitus of reality that is 
partially removed from the world inhabited by the viewer of a film). 
Ingarden’s first set of analyses of the filmic work of art focuses on the silent film, so 
it is quite understandable that he would exclude the stratum of words and word sounds 
from the essential ontological structure of the filmic work of art. Ingarden’s later re-
marks on film address films with synchronized sound (i.e., “talkies”)3. Though Ingarden 
maintains that (in terms of its ontology) the sound-synchronized filmic art is primar-
ily made up of visual aspects, he suggests that the phonetic elements of a concretized 
sound-synchronized film—i.e., the sounds; “the words spoken by presented persons 
(perhaps also the sounds made by animals)” (Ingarden, 1989, 321); as well as the sounds 
not typically associated with any visually presented narrator, i.e., the voice-overs that 
have been used to great effect in Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now (1979), Ridley 
Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), as well as in the opening sequences of Lars von Trier’s The 
Element of Crime (1984) and Europa (1991)—only play a marginal role in the concret-
ized filmic “spectacle” (Ingarden, 1989, 317). I observe that there is something a bit off 
with Ingarden’s account of the limited role of phonetic material in sound-synchronized 
film. While Ingarden’s insistence sound-synchronized films are primarily composed of 
represented visual aspects is adequate, in the sense that it does specify something essen-
tial about the filmic work of art’s ontological structure, his associated claim that the pho-
netic content of sound-synchronized films only enjoys a diminished role is an unusual 
mis-step for such a rigorous thinker4. Though I concur with Ingarden’s suggestion that 
art (Helman, Osadnik, Plesnar, & Wilk, 1994, 377–397). B. Dziemodok’s and P. McCormick’s On the 
Aesthetics of Roman Ingarden: Interpretations and Assessments (Dziemidok & McCormick, 1989) 
contains essays which trace out Ingarden’s thought with respect to the literary work of art, the 
sculpture, and the painting, but the filmic work of art is barely discussed. Recently, Marek Haltof 
presents a substantive elaboration of Ingarden’s contributions to early phenomenological film 
theory in Poland and—still more recently—Olivier Malherbe offers a wonderful reconstruction 
of the Ingarden’s thought that prioritizes its relevance to the French tradition of film theory 
(Haltof, 1998, 67–78; Malherbe, 2016, 185–214). 
3 The first “talkie” (Alan Crosland’s The Jazz Singer) premiered on October 6, 1927 in New York City 
(Bradley, 2004, 7). In all probability Ingarden, who was living in Lwów (the Ukrainian city of Lviv) 
at the time, had no access to or knowledge of sound-synchronized films while he was writing The 
Literary Work of Art. 
4 Ingarden does not use the term “hierarchy” or any of its lexical equivalents in either of his analy-
ses of the filmic work of art. However, Ingarden’s conceptualization of the strata as hierarchically 
686 ROBERT LUZECKY
the phonetic elements in sound-synchronized films do not need their own ontological 
stratum, I suggest a modification to Ingarden’s claims about the function of phonetic 
elements in concretized sound-synchronized filmic works of art—i.e., I suggest that the 
that Ingarden is too quick with his suggestion that the phonetic elements of sound-syn-
chronized films only enjoy a diminished status in relation to the presentation of visible 
aspects. I claim that—in concretized sound-synchronized filmic works—the phonetic 
elements should be granted a status that is on par that associated with the presentation 
of objects by visual (i.e., photographic) means. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of Ingarden’s analyses of filmic works 
of art, if for no other reason than they have contributed to a vibrant discussion of the 
ontological nature and the affective capacities of the filmic work of art. Witold Płotka 
does an admirable job of elaborating on Ingarden’s crucial role in the development 
of early phenomenology (Płotka, 2017, 86). Elaborating on Ingarden’s importance to 
phenomenological aesthetics, Helman observes that Ingarden “introduces order and 
rigour into the study of an art which is notoriously resistant to these virtues” (Helman, 
1975, 98). Much of this this order is derived from Ingarden’s suggestion that works of 
art (of various types) enjoy an ontological stratification—a concept that was taken up 
almost immediately by Bolesław Lewicki and Zofia Lissa (Lewicki, 1935, 69–87; Lissa, 
1937)—after its identification in The Literary Work of Art (Ingarden, 1973b). Elabo-
rating on the number of ontological strata involved with auditory sphere of film Lissa 
suggests that film music involves two strata—roughly corresponding to noises and the 
speech of psycho-social entities. In his argument against Hartman’s competing theory 
of ontological stratification, Ingarden explicitly notes that music is an artistic form 
which enjoys none of ontological stratification (Ingarden, 1989, 28–32). Were one to 
transpose Ingarden’s arguments here, they would amount to a decisive rejection of 
Lissa’s suggestion. Helman, Osadnik, Plesnar, & Wilk offer a detailed account of the 
limits of Lewicki’s similar suggestion that one should multiply the number of strata 
involved in filmic works of art (Helman, Osadnik, Plesnar, & Wilk, 1994, 379–380). 
Perhaps motivated by these perceived failures to adequately identify the number func-
tion of the various strata involved in filmic works of art, Helman abandoned her plan 
arranged is presupposed in his writings on various works of art. Anita Szczepańska highlights this 
hierarchical arrangement of the strata when she writes: “The work of art is generally composed of 
several strata arranged in a hierarchic order. The functions of all the strata in relation to the others 
determine their mutual organic relationship and their structural unity, with successive ‘lower’ strata 
forming foundations for the ‘higher’ ones, conditioning their existence and defining their charac-
teristics” (Szczepańska, 1989, 24). Though he makes no mention of the filmic work of art, Daniel 
von Wachter elaborates on the nature of Ingarden’s utilization of ontological dependency relations 
(Wachter, 2013, 55–82). 
HORIZON 9 (2) 2020 687
of “exploiting” the strata in service of filmic analysis. (Helman, Osadnik, Plesnar, & 
Wilk, 1994, 382). Stefan Morawski takes Helman’s critical assessment of Ingarden to 
its extreme with his suggestion that virtually everything Ingarden ever wrote about 
works of art in general and filmic works of art in particular is without philosophical 
merit—i.e., according to Morawski, a “film does not consist of manifestations, repre-
sented objects and events; it is not intentional, and it is not unreal” (Morawski, 1985, 
28). Morawski’s polemical extravagances should be regarded as dubious, if for no oth-
er reason the surfeit of philosophical literature which tacitly (and sometimes quite 
explicitly) accepts many of the claims that Morawski denies. Illustrative of this point 
is Osanik’s and Plesnar’s acceptance of Ingarden’s suggestions that the filmic work of 
art involves representations which enjoy stratification (Osadnik & Plesnar, 1991, 63).
Though Ingarden suggested much that is essential to our contemporary un-
derstanding of the filmic work of art, I suggest a modification to his remarks on the 
function of sound in concretized sound-synchronized films. The argument progress-
es through two stages: (1) I clarify Ingarden’s claim that the work of art is a stratified 
formation in which the various aspects present objectivities; (2) I elucidate Ingarden’s 
suggestion that the filmic work of art is a borderline case in respect to its relation to 
other types of works of art—paintings and literary works—. Here, I identify a problem 
with Ingarden’s claims about the function of sound in the concretized filmic work’s 
presentation of a quasi-reality. Ingarden identifies the presented universe of the filmic 
work of art as a habitus of reality, but Ingarden seems oddly conflicted with respect to 
his notion of habitus. This stems from Ingarden’s conceptualization of the filmic work 
of art as primarily composed of the stratum of represented “visible aspects” in both 
the cases of the silent film and the sound-synchronized film, and his restriction of 
the role of phonetic content in the latter. I suggest that were we to reconceptualise the 
role of aurally presented phonetic content in the sound-synchronized film, we could 
better understand how film has the seeming magical capacity to transfix us—allowing 
us to participate with the habitus of its world. Taken together, these claims yield that 
suggestions that were we to reconceptualise the role of aurally accessible phonetic 
content in sound-synchronized films, we could better understand how these draw us 
into presented habitus of their worlds.
2. THE “WORK OF ART” AS A STRATIFIED FORMATION
When Ingarden uses the term “work of art,” he is not simply referring to the 
sort of entity that enjoys spatio-temporally localization (e.g., the novel on the table, 
the painting on the wall, the sculpture in the garden, the building adjacent to the city 
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square, etc.). For Ingarden, “the work of art” is that which can be actualized, concre-
tized, and therefore functions as an aesthetic object. For example, the filmic work of 
art is not “the ribbon of celluloid that is covered with a series of pictures” (Ingarden, 
1989, 317). Were we to assert that the work of art was reducible to its physical materi-
al, this would yield the dubious result that there are as many versions of a film as there 
exist its instantiations as material entities—a view which has suffered the ignominious 
distinction of being met with almost universal rejection. As Noël Carroll elaborates:
The film performance is generated from a template—standardly a film print, but it might 
also be a video tape or a laser disc, or computer program. These templates are tokens, 
each one of them can be destroyed and each one can be assigned to a special location. But 
the film—say Broken Blossoms by D. W. Griffith—is not destroyed, when any of the prints 
are destroyed, including the negative or master. Indeed all of the prints can be destroyed 
and the film will survive if a laser disc does, or if a collection of photos of all the frames 
does, or if a computer program of it does whether on disk, or on tape, or even on paper 
or in human memory. (Carroll, 1995, 77)
Were one to attempt to reduce the film to its material components, this would 
entirely overlook Ingarden’s nuanced ontologies of the film involve substantive dis-
cussions of the complex relations that obtain among the processes of concretization, 
actualization, and the formation of the aesthetic object. As Jeff Mitscherling notes, 
to properly understand Ingarden’s concept of a work of art, “we have to distinguish 
between three terms: (1) realization (or actualization), (2) concretization, and (3) the 
aesthetic object” (Mitscherling, 1997, 160, fn. 13). The first of these terms refers to the 
activity by which the potential of a given material object is made to obtain. For exam-
ple, when Alexandros of Antioch sculpts a block of marble into the Venus de Milo, it is 
realized as something which has various schematic—not fully determined—aspects. 
A material work, once it has achieved realization, has various elements that are held 
in readiness (i.e., they exist as elements of the “work of art” that are awaiting fulfil-
ment by the intentional acts of psycho-social entities). In other words, the work of art 
for Ingarden is not the physical object, but that which stands ready for actualization, 
which is achieved through the separate processes of a) the artist’s creation of the work 
of art and b) the process of the audience’s viewing the work of art. The actualization of 
the potential of the physical work of art is the ongoing concretization of the work of 
art as an aesthetic object. This concretization is a process distinct from the process of 
its physical work of art’s realization, but dependent on it. The entity produced by these 
analytically distinct processes is not yet, complete—fully realized; determined in all 
of its possible properties—, in the sense that it undergoes a further concretization by 
the psycho-social entities that particulate with it through acts of viewing or otherwise 
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interacting with it. Only once this final process of concretization has been initiated, 
does the entity “achieve [sic.] its full incarnation” (Ingarden, 1973b, 372) as an aesthet-
ic object. Taken together, these analyses yield the identification of the work of art as 
that entity which (unlike utilitarian objects—pencils, film projectors, penknives, etc.) 
has the potential to be actualized as an aesthetic object through the separate processes 
of its realization and ongoing concretization. 
Ingarden conceives of the work of art as an ontologically stratified formation in 
which the strata differ from each other in terms of both “their characteristic material”5 
and “the role each stratum plays in relation to other strata and the structure of the 
whole work” (Ingarden, 1973b, 29). To understand the work of art as a stratified struc-
ture, it is important to distinguish between a) the elements of a work of art and b) the 
strata that constitute a work of art. Ingarden points out that, to qualify as a stratified 
structure, a work of art must satisfy four necessary and sufficient conditions. First, 
the “work of art is composed of “heterogeneous elements that appear in it” (Ingarden, 
1989, 32). I. e., a literary work of art involves words and word combinations, a filmic 
work of art involves different shots, scenes, and series. Second, the heterogeneous ele-
ments of a work of art “unite together into formations of a higher order that ultimate-
ly pervades the whole of its structure” (Ingarden, 1989, 32). E. g., the various shots 
of a filmic work of art combine together to form scenes, etc. Third, these elements 
do not lose their “relative independence and delimitation in the whole of the work” 
(Ingarden, 1989, 32). That is, we can discern the various scenes and shots of a film. 
Finally, Ingarden notes that “an organic union obtains” (Ingarden, 1989, 32) among 
the constituent elements of the work6. The stratified structure of a work of art is what 
5 Ingarden’s rather odd use of the term “material” in his elaboration of the strata of literary works 
of art invites misinterpretation and demands clarification. The term “material” does not refer to 
material in any physical sense (i.e., the material of the various strata does not have physical exten-
sion). Rather, the matter of a stratum is its ontological elements. In this sense, the material of the 
schematized stratum is the particular ways by which meanings are schematized (i.e., the material 
is schematization itself). Similarly, the material of the stratum of represented objectivities is the 
particular represented objects in a text, none of which have any particular spatio-temporal location 
in the physically extended world. This use of the term “material” gets a bit confounded when we try 
to apply it to the phonetic stratum, which has physical signs (i.e., the inscribed text on the pages of 
a book) as one of its ontological elements. Ingarden repeatedly points out that the phonetic stratum 
cannot be reduced to the inscribed text. Though the phonetic stratum involves physical graphic 
representations, it also involves the non-physical sounds of phonemes. It is the interrelation of these 
elements that constitutes the characteristic material of the phonetic stratum.
6 Ingarden’s claim that artworks are organic structures is left under-developed in The Literary Work 
of Art. As a consequence, the claim is too easily dismissed as a mere metaphorical flourish. It seems, 
however, that Ingarden was being quite literal. Ingarden elaborates on the nature of an organic 
structure (taken in its generality) in The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art (Ingarden, 1973a). 
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designates the relations of the various elements to each other, and these relations are 
necessary to the unity of description of the work of art as a whole. When we speak of 
the strata of a work of art, we are referring to the relations of the elements (specifically, 
for instance, the graphically represented objects in a painting). For example, Ingarden 
maintains that literary works of art are constituted by four strata: (1) the “linguistic 
stratum” of phonological elements. This stratum is constituted by the inscribed words 
of a text, their requisite sounds, and the higher linguistic and phonetic formations 
built on the words and word sounds in a given piece of literature (i.e., the sentences, 
and paragraphs); (2) the stratum of meaning units; (3) the stratum of represented ob-
jects; (4) the stratum of schematized aspects.
All types of works of art except for the musical work of art present visible as-
pects. In order to understand the role of visible aspects in the filmic work of art, it 
is necessary to clarify Ingarden’s use of the term “aspect” (Ansicht). The aspects of a 
work of art are the various modes of appearance of the objectivities—i.e., the objects 
and states of affairs presented in the literary work of art, the painting, the sculpture, 
the architectural work, and filmic work of art7. Perhaps it is helpful to understanding 
the nature of this stratum through reference to Ingarden’s elucidation of its function 
in the ontology of literary works of art. The aspects of a literary work of art are pre-
sented by means of words and word formations. For example, Yukio Mishima’s The 
Temple of Dawn presents particular objects like “a small design of scattered cherry 
petals” (Mishima, 1990, 196) and states of affairs like “the faint ringing of a distant 
bell” (Mishima, 1990, 196) as aspects that are present in the novel’s reality. Ingarden 
notes that, in literary works of art, the aspects are schematic because they are not 
In order to be considered “organic” an entity must fulfill three conditions: (1)  the entity should 
“perform a particular main function, to which various other functions, performed by its individual 
organs, are subordinated” (Ingarden, 1973a, 74); (2) this system of functions is “closely related to 
the structure of the organism, which is adapted to them” (Ingarden, 1973a); (3) the entity has “a 
certain typical course of life [that] is manifested in all organisms” (Ingarden, 1973a, 76). The strata 
of a literary work of art each have certain aesthetic value qualities, and these coalesce to form a “pol-
yphonic harmony” of values which define the literary work of art as an aesthetic object (Mitscher-
ling, 1997, 139). In this sense, the literary work of art fulfills the first of the conditions of being 
organic. The function of the literary work of art is to obtain its realization as an aesthetic object, 
and the particular value it has as an aesthetic object is dependent on the ontological structure of the 
literary work of art. The literary work of art meets the second of these conditions, in the sense that 
it fulfils a function that is identical to that of other literary works of art. This point is amplified when 
we recognize that the literary work of art’s function is derived from an ontological structure that is 
identical with the ontological structure of other literary works of art. Finally, the literary work of art 
meets the third condition, in the sense that it enjoys a peculiar form of “life” as an aesthetic object.
7 Mitscherling is one of the few who have elaborated on Ingarden’s (often overlooked) discussion of 
the architectural work of art (Mistcherling, 2004). 
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gene rated by the experience of any psychic individual but instead have the basis of 
their determination, and in a certain sense, their potential existence in the states of 
affairs projected by the sentences or in the objects represented by means of states of 
affairs. (Ingarden, 1973b, 264).
The aspects are not a product of reader’s psychic operations, though the aspects 
guide these operations when the reader is experiencing the literary work of art. Thus, 
the work of art’s aspects “portray determinate real objectivities” (Ingarden, 1973b, 
264) that are real within the context of the work, and which are actualized by the per-
son who experiences the work of art. Because the aspects of works of art present the 
particularities of things and states of affairs which the reader has not experienced in 
his own reality, their actualization “never succeeds in such a way that the contents of 
the aspects actualized by him could be similar in detail to the aspects he would have 
experienced” (Ingarden, 1973b, 264) had these aspects been presented in their partic-
ularity in the person’s non-fictive reality. 
The filmic work of art presents its reality through the “polyphonic” inter-relation 
of its strata. Ingarden claims that both silent and the sound-synchronized filmic works 
of art possess only two strata: the stratum of represented objects (i.e., the objects and 
states of affairs that are presented on the screen) and the stratum of schematized aspects, 
by which the presented objectivities become manifest. Works of art are schematized, in 
the sense that their presented aspects are not fully determined—i.e., they are presented 
as lacking complete, specification of their predicates or properties. Ingarden refers to the 
aspects of the latter stratum as schematized, because no object or state of affairs is pre-
sented by a work of art in a fully determinate manner. With respect to the concretized 
filmic work, these elements are presented as schematic aspects, because they are pre-
sented to the viewer as part of a schematized whole, and they achieve their realization 
through their presentation to the viewer. This ongoing act of participation with a work 
of art is one of the ways a work of art can be concretized. For example, when a film is 
projected to the audience, the audience concretizes the schematic aspects of the film that 
have been realized in the presented images, but which have not yet been concretized un-
til the film is viewed; these images are given meaning through the viewer’s perception of 
them. This act of attentively viewing a film yields the ongoing concretization of the film 
as an aesthetic object. The objectivities presented by a work of art are schematized, inso-
far as they exist potentially in the states of affairs and things presented by the work of art. 
These are fulfilled by the intentional processes of the person who experiences the work 
of art as a potential aesthetic object. Ingarden carefully identifies the difference among 
real objects and schematized objects through reference to their formal characteristics. 
Ingarden observes: (1) real objects tend to enjoy complete determination—i.e., “every 
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real object is unequivocally, universally (… in every respect) determined”; (2) real objects 
enjoy a primary ontological unity, which serves as the ontic base of intentional acts of 
constitution; (3) each real object is “absolutely individual,” in the sense that any general 
property or quality predicated of it—such as a particular colour—is predicated of it as 
an individuated entity (Ingarden, 1973b, 246–247). Schematized entities enjoy only di-
minished determinations, in the sense that some of their properties are unfulfilled. I. e., 
schematized entities involve what Ingarden characterizes as “spots of indeterminacy” 
(Ingarden, 1973b, 246)8. These under-determined properties are the entity’s schema. To 
the extent that objects and states of affairs are not fully determined in a work of art, they 
are “schematized.” For example, not all details of a character’s appearance are given by 
the author of a literary work, so the reader is required to fulfil these aspects to constitute 
the entity as an intentional object. Similarly, in filmic works of art, the objects and states 
of affairs in a film are not given in a fully determinate manner. (E. g., the weight the stat-
uette in John Huston’s The Maltese Falcon is not specified in the film, so the viewer is re-
quired to fulfil these aspects to make the objects or fully manifest to his consciousness.)
8 In his elaboration of the nature of schematized aspects and their fulfilment, Ingarden makes explicit 
reference to Husserl’s complex elaboration of intentional fulfilment. Spiegelberg observes that Hus-
serlian intentional directedness at an object involves four discrete characteristics: (1) objectivation; 
(2)  identification; (3)  connection; (4)  constitution. The intentional act of fulfilling schematized 
aspects occurs in the intuitive fulfilment of an entity which appears as an incomplete—not yet 
fully determined—form. This tends to be associated with the intentional process of connection 
(Spiegelberg, 1965, 108–111). Mitscherling presents an excellent elaboration of Ingarden’s concept 
of schematized aspects (and their fulfilment), while these remarks are about the stratum of sche-
matized aspects in a literary work of art, the identification of the nature of schematized aspects is 
transposable to filmic works of art, in the sense that these involve the presentation of schematized 
aspects—albeit in a different way. Mitscherling writes: “Some basic phenomenology is necessary 
for the clarification of the nature of this stratum. When consciousness attends to (or ‘intends’) a 
particular object, it is usually the case that only some of the ‘aspects’ of that object are presented 
immediately to consciousness, and these aspects are said to be either fulfilled or unfulfilled. For 
example, when we look to a table from above, the table presents us with the aspect of ‘table-top’ 
and ‘table-bottom’, and the former is fulfilled while the latter remains unfulfilled. When we look 
at the table from beneath, the former (table-top) aspect is unfulfilled and the latter (table-bottom) 
is fulfilled. A similar situation obtains in the case of the literary work of art, but here the reader is 
often forced to fulfil for herself many of those aspects that are presented by the author as unfulfilled, 
and she does so with regard to those aspects that are presented more fully, i.e., as fulfilled. The latter 
provide the reader with a direction to follow in her intentional activity of fulfilling these unfulfilled 
aspects, which are said to have been presented as ‘schematized’. This intentional activity of the ful-
filment of schematized aspects is a central component of the general activity of ‘concretization’. As 
no character, for example, can ever be exhaustively presented by an author—no character, that is to 
say, can ever be portrayed as fully and completely determined—the manner in which this concreti-
zation is to proceed can only be schematically determined by the literary work through its stratum 
of these schematized aspects” (Mitscherling, 2010, 143–144, fn.10)  .
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3. THE “BORDERLINE” QUALITIES OF FILMIC WORK OF ARTS  
AND ITS PRESENTATIONS OF HABITUS
Given the ontological similarities that seems exist among the ontologies of var-
ious works of art—that, for the most part, they enjoy ontological stratification—one 
might be led to the erroneous claim that various types of works of enjoy identity with 
one another. Ingarden cautiously observes that works of art are non-identical to one 
another in terms of both their ontological structure and their modes of presentation 
as entities undergoing concretization. One might observe that works of arts bear a 
similarity in terms of their capacities to express (or from the viewer’s perspective, 
produce) affects. Andrey Tarkovsky once characterized his films as attempts to fulfil 
the “fervent wish… to speak out…to say everything with total sincerity and without 
imposing my own point of view on others” (Tarkovsky, 1986, 12). This sentiment has 
perhaps been echoed by other artists—painters, poets, sculptors, musicians, novelists, 
architects—throughout the ages. One possible implication of this claim is the sugges-
tion that art of various types is similar, in the sense that it fulfills a similar human need 
to express something essential about the human condition. Tarkovsky’s allusion to the 
profound beauties of various works of art brings to mind Witkiewicz’s suggestion that 
works of art express the metaphysical feelings of the artist’s “experiencing of the se-
cret of existence as unity in variety” (Ingarden, 1973b, 294, fn. 9). Ingarden identifies 
these as any of “the sublime, the tragic, the dreadful, the shocking, the inexplicable, 
the demonic, the holy, the sinful, the sorrowful, the indescribable brightness of good 
fortune, as well as the grotesque, the charming, the light, the peaceful, etc.” (Ingarden, 
1973b, 290–291). Roland Barthes further elucidates on the nature of these in his elab-
oration of punctum of still photographs—i.e., those visual elements “which rise [sic.] 
from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces” the viewer (Barthes, 1981, 
26). Though we can recognize the capacity of art to express these sorts of qualities, 
Tarkovsky cautions against the attempt to establish an identity relation among various 
types of art on the basis of their capacity to express these qualities, when he notes 
that there is something unique to cinema—something “distinctively cinematic”—, 
which is lost when one attempts to translate one type of art into another9. Perhaps 
here one may draw reference to the breath-taking penultimate shot of Tarkovsky’s 
9 Tarkovsky makes this point explicitly through reference to making a filmic work of art out of a lit-
erary work of art: “Trying to adapt the features of other art forms to the screen will always deprive 
the film of what is distinctively cinematic, and make it harder to handle the material in a way that 
makes use of the powerful resources of cinema as an art in its own right. But above all such a pro-
cedure sets up a barrier between the author of the film and life” (Tarkovsky, 1986, 22).
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Nostalghia (1983): the camera follows the character of Ardrei Gorchakov as he la-
boriously trudges across the drained pool of a mineral spring, desperately trying to 
preserve the flickering light of a candle during his journey to the other side of the 
fetid ruin. The agonizing frustration conveyed in these nine minutes and seven sec-
onds (the temporal duration of the uninterrupted shot), could scarcely be conveyed 
in literature, or a painting’s presentation static images. Ingarden carefully notes that 
any metaphysical qualities that may be evoked by a particular work of art subsist from 
its particular concretizations. (Ingarden, 1973b, 294-295). Due to the particularity 
of these concretizations, these qualities, are not directly involved with the generality 
implied by work’s ontological stratification. The suggestion here is that while works of 
art of various types may bear a relation to one another, to characterize them as having 
identical ontologies is as much a disservice to the particular beauty and meaning of 
any given work art work of art as it is an assault on any notion of rigorous ontology. 
Throughout his numerous intricate ontologies of various types of art, Ingarden al-
ways carefully identifies what is the ontological makes each type of work ontologically 
unique. Ingarden specifies the ontology of the filmic work of art through comparison 
to both the painting and the literary work of art. 
Ingarden notes that the primary stratum of the filmic work of art is that of “visu-
al aspects”10. In this respect, the filmic work of art has an ontological structure which 
is analogous to that of a painting. The difference between these two types of works of 
art is that, in the painting, the stratum of represented visible aspects presents a single 
isolated moment in the temporal continuum, whereas in the filmic work of art, the 
stratum of visible aspects presents a temporal flow. In the painting, the stratum of rep-
resented visible aspects shows “single moments of a process, but also intimates certain 
earlier and maybe also certain future phases of the process, which may be guessed by 
the viewer” (Ingarden, 1989, 325). Here Ingarden’s point seems to echo André Bazin’s 
claim that photographic images of cinema function to liberate temporal progression 
from the limits implied by a painting’s isolation of temporal progression to the statis-
tic presentation of a stationary entities. Bazin writes:
10 The filmic work of art presents the viewer with “a discontinuous manifold of ‘images’ that conceals 
its discontinuity, each image being a reconstitution by photographic means of a visual aspect of a 
determinate object or objective situation” (Ingarden, 1973b, 323). This claim is repeated in On-
tology of the Work of Art, where we are told that the filmic work of art is composed primarily of 
“visual aspects which are reconstructed on the screen with the help of patches of colour or of light 
and shadow [to] make possible the quasi-perceptual presentation of Objects that have been made 
visible, of things, of people, and of events.” (Ingarden, 1989, 324) 
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Viewed in this perspective, the cinema is objectivity in time. The film is no longer con-
tent to preserve the object, enshrouded as it were in an instant, as the bodies of insects 
are preserved intact, out of the distant past, in amber. The film delivers baroque art from 
catalepsy. Now, for the first time, the image of things is likewise the image of their dura-
tion, change mummified, as it were. Those categories of resemblance, which determine 
the species of photographic image likewise, then, determine its aesthetic as distinct from 
that painting. (Bazin, 2005, 14–15)
For example, Paul Cézanne’s Rideau, Cruchon et Compotier presents the view-
er with a manifold of aspects arrested in their temporal progress (e.g., the painting 
shows an apple poised to slide off the table). The viewer of the painting can intimate 
a past event where the apple slid to its position at the table’s edge, and he can imagine 
a future event in which the apple will slide off the table, yet neither of these events is 
directly presented in the painting. Were one to attribute any movement to any of the 
images within a painting, this would only be through the attribution of a unrepresent-
ed movement. A filmic work of art, by way of contrast, presents objects “just as paint-
ings do, yet in a manner essentially expanded and altered, since in their succession 
and fusion they permit the appearance of temporally extended events in their total 
concrete development” (Ingarden, 1973b, 324). (E. g., in Louis Lumière’s Workers Leav-
ing the Lumière Factory [1895], the represented objectivities of the workers bustling 
about and the dog sauntering across the frame depict time’s progress as something 
realized in the film, and not requiring the psychic processes of the perceiver.) For 
Ingarden, the filmic work of art “does not confine itself to presenting merely a single 
situation that is taken out of the whole story and is thus made static” (Ingarden, 1989, 
325). Thus, though the stratum of represented visible aspects is present in both the 
painting and the filmic work of art, the function of the visual stratum is qualitatively 
different in each case. Though both the painting and the filmic work of art have the 
same primary stratum of represented visible aspects, the function of this stratum in 
each type of work of art presents aspects in fundamentally different modalities (i.e., 
as that which is presented to the viewer in temporal progression, or as that which is 
frozen in time). 
Ingarden observes that the filmic work of art differs from the literary work of art 
to the extent that the latter possesses strata which are wholly absent from the former. 
The primary two strata of the literary work of art are the phonetic stratum of words 
and word sounds, and the stratum of meaning units. The silent filmic work of art lacks 
one of these and only has access to the other in a modified sense11. The implication 
11 Ingarden writes: “In the cinematographic drama, however, there is neither the stratum of phonetic 
formations nor that of units of meaning, both of which appear in a literary work. Therefore, roughly 
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of observation that there are no spoken words in a silent film suggests that the rep-
resented objectivities of a silent film enjoy a diminished reality. This can be demon-
strated through a caparison of the silent filmic work of art and the literary work of 
art when it is read aloud. In the case of the literary work of art, Ingarden observes 
that the meaning of the represented objectivities (i.e., the actions of the characters, 
the setting, etc.) involves a dependency relation of among the vocalized aspects of 
the phonetic stratum and the stratum of meaning units—the manifold of words and 
associated word sounds suggest the meaning of what is represented in the vocalized 
aspects of a literary work of art. This is clearly not the case with silent films, for the 
simple reason that the phonetic content only obtains in a very diminished sense (i.e., 
as the non-auditory dialogue which interrupts camera shots, sequences, and series of 
images). The dependency relation of phonetic content to meaning fails to obtain in a 
silent film because one of the terms of the relation (the phonetic content) is lacking 
one of its means of its realization. This can be illustrated by the sense of near preter-
natural dread that a viewer of F. W. Murnau’s Nosferatu, eine Symphonie des Grauens 
(1922) may experience when she witnesses the shadowy form of Count Olaf slowly 
sulking up the stairs. In absence of any spoken words, gasping breaths, and terrified 
cries words (which would—perhaps—specify the meaning of Olaf ’s furtive actions) 
the viewer is left painfully unaware of what motivates the monster. The claim is that 
the lack of the phonetic stratum in silent film diminishes the clarity of the meaning 
which associated with the rendering of representative objectivities in a literary work 
of art. This diminishment is particularly obvious when one attempts to discern the in-
teriority of a character—something not always revealed by an entity’s physical actions. 
Ingarden suggests that the schematized aspects of a silent film are presented through 
strictly visual means. The suggestion here is that meaning of the silent film has its 
ontic base in presented visual images. This essentially diminishes the precision and vi-
vacity of possible meanings we can derive from the silent filmic work. The silent film 
presents a series of representations whose meaning is emaciated, in the sense that the 
discontinuous series of images presents only a diminished means by which to appre-
hend a given character’s psychic attributes (i.e., thoughts, motivations, and emotional 
states). This is not to say these lack existential character, but it does have the effect 
of producing “a certain shift in the center of gravity of psychic existence” (Ingarden, 
speaking, only half the strata that are essential for the literary work remain. Consequently, it is not 
a literary work in a true sense… [T]he ultimate constituent stratum in a cinematographic drama is 
exclusively the stratum of visual aspects and not the stratum of meaning units. In other words, here, 
the sole constituting “material” is the reconstituted visual aspects, and they perform their consti-
tuting function by effecting the appearance of corresponding objectivities” (Ingarden, 1973b, 324).
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1973b, 325), wherein the psychic operations of the character have the quality of a 
certain “roughness,” (Ingarden, 1973b, 325) and the mental life of the presented ob-
jectivities is “pushed to the background, if not altogether removed” (Ingarden, 1973b, 
325) from the silent filmic work. 
Oddly, Ingarden seems to suggest that the diminished role of sound is not much 
different in the case of the sound-synchronized films. While word sounds are obvi-
ously part of the concretized sound-synchronized film, Ingarden implies that these 
are restricted to the role “of an ancillary means of presentation” (Ingarden, 1989, 331). 
Ingarden explicitly notes that in concretized sound-synchronized films, role of words 
and word sounds is only of marginal importance12. While language is present in the 
sound-synchronized filmic work of art, Ingarden claims that it is an inessential com-
ponent that is not fundamentally part of the ontological structure of the filmic work of 
art. To the extent that words and word sounds are present in the modern filmic work 
of art, it bears some similarity to the literary work of art, but insofar as the words do 
not constitute the primary means of the sound-synchronized filmic work of art’s pre-
sentation, the sound-synchronized filmic work of art is distinct from the literary work 
of art. The filmic work of art and the literary work of art are related to the extent that 
both utilize the same material (i.e., words and word sounds), but the function is rad-
ically different in each case. This is particularly evident in their respective modes of 
presentation—the reading aloud of a literary work (which has been the aim of litera-
ture from at least the time of the lyric poems of Ancient Greece); the viewing of a film. 
In both of his writings on the filmic work of art, Ingarden describes the filmic 
work as presenting a quasi-real world which involves the viewer, but which is of a fun-
damentally different order than that of the real world. The represented objectivities on 
the screen are projected images that are not “real,” because they lack ontic autonomy 
in two senses. Their existence as objects is dependent on the fact that they are filmed 
(i.e., they are representations), and their reality is established through the psychic op-
erations of the spectator. For Ingarden, “[t]he objects which are photographed, are so 
to speak, not simply real objects. They perform here a function of reproduction and 
representation; they play a ‘role’ ” (Ingarden, 1973b, 327). Insofar as they are playing 
a role, the objects presented on the screen have existential characterization as real 
12 Ingarden writes: “The mediating role of language, is not indispensable in the [sound-synchronized] 
film… Not language, but a multiplicity of flowing visual aspects, reconstructed photographical-
ly or graphically, constitutes the proper… means of presentation which gives the spectator access 
to the phenomenally appearing presented world not indispensable in the [sound-synchronized] 
film… Not language, but a multiplicity of flowing visual aspects, reconstructed photographically or 
graphically, constitutes the proper… means of presentation which gives the spectator access to the 
phenomenally appearing presented world” (Ingarden, 1989, 326.)
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objects within the presented world of the filmic work, but their position as existential 
objects is that of representations within a fictive universe, which gains reality as a fic-
tion through the psychic operations of the viewer13. This presented world is a habitus 
of the viewer’s reality, insofar as its ontic existence is derived from—at minimum—the 
process filming of the actor and other objects that the actor interacts with, and the 
intentional acts of the viewer who fills in the schematic aspects presented in the filmic 
work.
In his discussion of the habitus of the sound-synchronized filmic work, In-
garden seems to conflate the presented world of the filmic work with the film viewer’s 
reality. In Ingarden’s discussion of silent filmic works of art, the objectivities presented 
in the filmic work are removed from our own world be virtue of the very fact that 
they are representations of an entity that is non-identifiable with our own reality. The 
images on the screen are just images, presented as flickers on the distant screen in 
the darkened room. But Ingarden’s conceptualization of the filmic habitus undergoes 
some rather drastic modification in his discussion of the sound-synchronized filmic 
work of art. Here, Ingarden writes:
In his mental experiencing of these aspects [the objectivities presented by the sound-syn-
chronized filmic work], the spectator ceases to see the screen, and in its place sees in an 
almost perceptual manner things and people which conduct themselves in a certain way 
in the presented space (Ingarden, 1989, 326).
The language of partialities is still present here. Ingarden’s use of the term “al-
most” suggests that the filmic habitus is still removed from the reality inhabited by 
the film viewer. But it is difficult to grasp what constitutes the difference between the 
presented objectivities of the filmic reality and the viewer’s reality, because the viewer 
13 Ingarden draws this distinction in reference to the function of nominal words (i.e., nouns and noun 
phrases) in the literary work of art. The presentation of nominal words denotes the existence of an 
object. This is the existential characterization of an object. Borrowing one of Ingarden’s examples, 
when the reader is presented with the noun phrase “‘the capital of Poland,’ the city in question is 
intended not simply as a ‘city,’ but also as something which according to its mode of existence, is 
real” (Ingarden, 1973b, 70). Existential characterization designates that an object is characterized 
such as it would be were it to exist. Existential position, by way of contrast, determines the type of 
reality enjoyed by the object designated by the nominal word or word phrase. The name of a fiction-
al character, for example, denotes an “object that never existed or will exist but one which if it were 
to exist, would belong among objects to which the existential mode of ‘reality’ applies” (Ingarden, 
1973b, 70). In terms of the filmic work, the represented objectivities (i.e., the things and people the 
viewer sees on the screen), are existentially characterized as real and existentially positioned within 
the filmic world, which is rendered as a series of schematic aspects that are concretized by the psy-
chic operations of the person who views the filmic work. 
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no longer sees the screen. The presented space and the space occupied by the viewer 
seem to merge into one, insofar as the thing mediating the division between the two 
modes of reality (i.e., the screen) disappears from the viewer’s experience of reality.
The separation of the sound-synchronized filmic habitus from the viewer’s real-
ity gets a bit more difficult to determine when Ingarden specifies that:
The individual presented things and persons [of the sound-synchronized filmic work] 
move in a way that is independent of the spectator and apparently autonomous, and they 
comport themselves like real beings. This conduct comprehends not only what one can 
see, but also…all that can be heard, such as tones, noises, spoken words, etc. In particu-
lar, the presented people in general behave physically in a way completely similar to that 
of real people. (Ingarden, 1989, 326–327)
The presented objectivities of the filmic universe now seem to comport them-
selves in a way which is no longer simply representational, insofar as their conduct 
“comprehends” (begreift)—i.e., contains within itself—the experiential reality inhabi-
ted by the viewer of the film. This seeming conflation of the filmic world and the 
world inhabited by the viewer is amplified when Ingarden notes that the behaviour 
of the represented objectivities behave in a way which is “completely similar” (i.e., 
identical) to how the viewers of the filmic world behave. In other words, the filmic 
universe appears to be something which is no longer simply a habitus that is only qua-
si-real. Ingarden is indicating that the viewer enters into the presented world of the 
filmic universe to such an extent that he is no longer present merely as voyeur, but as 
someone who is participating with the film’s presented objectivities, existing with the 
“fictive figures and their fortunes, almost as in daily life” (Ingarden, 1989, 327). 
This entry into the presented reality of the film, and the seeming conflation of 
the viewer’s reality with the reality of filmic universe, is facilitated by the existence 
of sound (i.e., the aurally represented phonetic content of word sounds, noises, and 
other aural phenomena). The suspension of disbelief which occurs when the view-
er apprehends sound-synchronized films is a consequence of the presence of sound. 
Thus, the role of sound in modern filmic works greatly augments the reality of the 
filmic universe (increasing it to the point that the existential position of the presented 
objectivities seems to be the same as the viewer’s). This augmentation of the habitus of 
the reality of concretized sound-synchronized films indicates that Ingarden unfairly 
restricted the role of aural content in these. Sound functions to draw the viewer into 
the presented world to such a degree that the distinction between the quasi-real of the 
presented universe borders on conflation with the viewer’s universe. While the dis-
tinction still remains between the two (the presented world and the world of the view-
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er), this distinction becomes all the more difficult to specify. (I. e., the existential po-
sition of the presented realities gets called into question due to the presence of sound 
in the sound-synchronized filmic work.) This indicates that, if we are to maintain the 
fineness of the distinction between the habitus of the filmic world and the world of 
the viewer, it is necessary to modify Ingarden’s conceptualization of the function of 
sound in concretized sound-synchronized films to recognize that it plays more than 
an ancillary role. Because phonetic content (identified as involving any of vocalized 
word or animal sounds, noises, music either used as part of the diegetic narrative or as 
an aspect of the film’s soundtrack) in the concretization of sound-synchronized films 
functions to diminish the existential gap between the filmic work’s presented universe 
and the lived universe of the spectator (between the real and the quasi-real), we have 
to alter Ingarden’s claim that sound merely plays an inessential role in the concretized 
sound-synchronized filmic work of art.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Ingarden’s conceptualization of the filmic work of art needs revision. For In-
garden, the work of art is not simply the physical work of art. Rather, the work of art is 
that which undergoes ongoing processes of concretization. These process of concreti-
zation of a work of art involve either of the two distinct processes of the artist’s reali-
zation of the physical work of art or the viewer’s beholding of the realized work of art. 
In concretizing the work of art, we recognize it as an organic unity. The filmic work of 
art is constituted by strata which are similar to those of the painting and the literary 
work of art, though these strata function differently in the painting, the literary work 
of art, and both types of filmic work of art —i.e., silent and sound-synchronized films. 
Like paintings, the filmic works of art presents things and states of affairs primarily 
through the stratum of represented visual aspects, yet the visual aspects presented in 
the painting show things and states of affairs arrested in their temporal progression, 
and filmic works of art shows entities and states of affairs in temporal progression. 
Like the literary work of art, the sound-synchronized filmic work of art involves pho-
netic material, but the role of the phonetic material is radically different in these two 
types of works of art. Ingarden carefully observes that phonetic content does not en-
joy a role of ontological primacy in filmic works of art — represented visible aspects 
are more fundamental in both silent and sound-synchronized filmic works. Oddly, 
Ingarden seems to suggest that this ontological primacy of the visible implies a prior-
itization of the visible in reference the importance of the sound-synchronized filmic 
presentation. Ingarden’s restriction of the role of sound in the sound-synchronized 
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filmic works of art is odd, since the presence of sound in these serves to blur the 
distinction between the reality inhabited by the viewer of the filmic work of art and 
the universe presented by the filmic work of art. That is, in the sound-synchronized 
filmic work of art, sound functions to obscure the existential position of the present-
ed objects and states of affairs. If we are to accurately describe the role of sound in 
the sound-synchronized filmic work of art, then it is necessary to modify the role of 
sound in the modern film. 
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